A HUNDRED AND TEN YEARS OF THE CONSTITUTION-PART XI.
It will be noticed that the vote in the Virginia Convention
was in the proportion of nine to eight in favor of ratification-a very even division. Whether this was the result of
the arguments of Mr. Henry and others as to the necessity
of a bill of rights and certain amendments as conditions precedent to ratification, or to an unwillingness to enter into a
union of a radically different character from the Confederacy, it is not possible to say with certainty. But the strong
probability is that the former was the controlling reason for
the large negative vote. Of'course, there was also the conservative spirit, which makes us often choose to bear the
ills we have rather than fly to others that we know not of.
The proposed new Government was admittedly an untried
experiment. Mr. Madison had frankly told the Convention
that it was sui generis-that there was ndt its like to be
found in history; and men naturally hesitate to risk their all
upon an unknown sea.
Second only to Virginia in importance was Massachusetts.
The Convention in that State was held in January, 1788.
It was a much larger body than the Virginia Convention, its
members numbering about three hundred and fifty. The
debates are not as fully or as accurately reported, but there
is quite enough to give us a clear idea of the proceedings.
There were fewer participants in debate, proportionately,
than in Virginia, and there seems to have been less ability
displayed. But there is much similarity between the debates
in the two Conventions-much the same arguments were
used for and against the Constitution. It was resolved at
the outset-just as in Virginia-to debate the Constitution
section by section; and this resolution, while not perhaps
strictly adhered to, was yet much better enforced than in
Virginia-possibly owing to the absence of any counter406
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part of Patrick Henry, although Messrs. Thompson and
Nason were not unlike him. Of course, it was contended
by the extreme opponents of the Constitution that it was a
scheme for consolidation, which, if adopted, would annihilate the State Governments. But its partly Federal, partly
National character seems to have been more generally understood and appreciated than in Virginia. It was quite
understood that it was a radical departure from the Articles
,of Confederation-and the chief and most weighty objection to it was that it might easily become a centralized government, putting the people out of control of their own
immediate affairs; and local self-government was one thing
which they could not then-and would not now-abandon.
Realizing that the new government would act on individuals
in many ways, and was intended to do so, they felt that the
absence of a bill of rights, and of an express declaration that
the new government's powers were to be those granted by
the instruments, and no more, was for that very reason a
serious defect. There was, happily, a strong realization that
the interests of all the States were in many ways identical
and bound up with each other. General Heath declared freely
in the debates that he considered himself not as an inhabitant
of Massachusetts, but as a citizen of the United States. The
remark was made when the Convention was debating the
-powers for the biennial election of representatives. Some
members considered that the elections should be annual, and
Montesquieu was quoted to that effect. To this it was replied by Mr. Davis that the remark applied to "single governments and not to confederated ones," and it was again
and again pointed out that as Congress and the other
branches of the new government were given certain definately stated powers and no others, the annihilation of the
State Governments was impossible-and, indeed, that, as in
many ways, the National Government was dependent upon
the States. For example, in the Senate, and even in the
House, as its members were to be chosen by those entitled to
vote for the more numerous branch of the State Legislatures,
the ruin of the State Governments would carry with it the
ruin of the National Government, and this, although it was
distinctly admitted that it was not a simple Confederacy
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which they were framing. Mr. King said, "The introduction to his Constitution is in these words: 'We, the people."
The language of the Confederation is, 'We, the States.' The
latter is a mere Federal Government of States. Those,
therefore, that assemble under it have no power to make
laws to apply to the individuals of the States confederated."
And Mr. Stillman later quoted with approval the letter of
Governor Randolph, in which he points out the impossibility
of satisfactorily amending the Articles of Confederation,
and the consequent necessity for throwing them aside.
Very strong expressions as to the vital necessity for Union
are frequent, and those who did not like the Constitution in many ways voted for it in the end rather than risk
disunion. It is doubtful, however, whether the Constitution would have been ratified had it not been for the introduction of certain suggested amendments by Mr. Hancock,
the President. I think that if these amendments had been
made conditions precedent to Massachusett's adoption of the
Constitution, it would have been adopted by a very large
majority. The amendments were discussed at length, many
of them, and all affirmed. One of the amendments was to
the effect that all powers not expressly delegated to Congress
are reserved to the States. This Mr. Adams pronounced
to be a summary of a bill of rights, and consistent with the
second article of the Confederation, as to the retention by
each State of its sovereignty, independence, etc. But Mr.
Mason was not yet satisfied. He adverted to the preamble
of the Constitution, and said if it did not go to the annihilation of the State Governments, and to a perfect consolidation
of the whole Union, he did not know what did. He said
further: "We are under oath; we have sworn that Massachusetts is a sovereign and independent State. How, then,
can we vote for this Constitution, that destroys that sovereignty ?"
Colonel Varnum begged to remind him that that very oath
provided an exception of the power to be granted to Congress.
The form of ratification which was submitted to the Convention was as follows:
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The Convention having impartially discussed and fully
considered the Constitution for the United States of America, reported to Congress by the Convention of Delegates
from the United States of America, and submitted to us by
a resolution of the General Court of the said Commonwealth.
passed the twenty-fifth day of October last past; and acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe in affording the people of the
United States, in the course of His providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud or surprise.
of entering into a solemn compact with each other, by assenting and ratifying a new Constitution, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves
and their posterity, DO, in the name and in behalf of the
people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, assent to and
ratify the said Constitution for the United States of America. And, as it is the opinion of this Convention, that certain
amendments and alterations in the said Constitution would
remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of many of the
good people of the Commonwealth, and more effectually
guard against an undue administration of the Federal Government, the Convention do therefore recommend that the
following alterations and provisions be introduced into the
said Constitution," etc. Then follow nine amendments, only
a few of which we need notice. i. "That it be explicitly
declared, that all powers not expressly delegated by the
aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several States to
be by them exercised." 3. "That Congress do not exercise
the powers vested in them by the fourth section of the first
article [to regulate elections], but in cases where a State
shall neglect or refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations subversive of the rights of
the people to a free and equal representation in Congress,
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agreeably to the Constitution." 4. The fourth suggested
amendment limits the power of Congress to levy direct taxes,
except where requisitions have not been complied with. After setting out the amendments, the form of ratification goes
on to urge upon the representatives in Congress to use all
reasonable and legal methods to secure their adoption. The
vote on the question of ratification was, Ayes 187, Noes 168.
It is quite an interesting fact that there is a strong local
tinge to the vote-the counties of Suffolk and Essex voting
almost unanimously "Aye," the county of Worcester voting
almost unanimously "No."
It is noticeable here-as in Virginia-that there was no
discussion practically as to the bestowal upon the General
Government the exclusive exercise of all the highly sovereign
powers. The whole people, if their representatives in the
Convention were really representative, was, on the one side,
absolutely convinced of the necessity of a firm and indissoluble Union, and equally, on the other, of the necessity of a
determined stand against centralization.
We have been in the South and in New England; let us
go now to the Middle States. The New York Convention
assembled at Poughkeepsie in June, 1788. It was a much
smaller body than either the Virginia or the Masschusetts
Convention, having only about sixty members. Yates, Lansing and Hamilton attended, as did Jay, Chancellor Livingston and several other distinguished and able men. The debates as they come down to us are somewhat fragmentary;
but they are very intetesting, and show, it seems to me, much
The general
more ability than those in Massachusetts.
question was very fully discussed, and many highly significant things were said. The extreme difficulty of the question-the novel and unprecedented nature of the new Government-appears very clearly, and much cogent argument
was forthcoming on both sides. Indeed, after the Convention had been sitting about a week, Mr. Hamilton remarked
that it was extremely easy, on each side, to say a number of
plausible things, and then laid down with characteristic clearness the following general proposition: "There are two
objects in forming systems of government-safety for the
people, and energy in the administration. When these ob-
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jects are limited, the certain tendency of the system will be
to the public welfare. If the latter object be neglected, the
people's security will be as certainly sacrificed as by disregarding the former. Good Constitutions are formed upon a
comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength
of governments: if the tone of either be too high, the other
will be weakened too much."
After the preliminary work of organization, the Convention resolved itself into a committee of the whole,.and Chancellor Livingston took the floor in explanation of the general nature and purpose of the new Constitution and in advocacy of it. He maintained that the Confederation was
defective in principle, as it operated upori States in their
political capacity, and not upon individuals; that "it carried
with it the seeds of domestic violence, and tended ultimately
to its dissolution." Also, that a federal republic, as the
steward of a league among independent States, had always
disappointed its advocates. He was followed next day by
Mr. Lansing, one of the opponents of the Constitution in the
General Convention, in an able, conservative speech, in which"
he said that he still was apprehensive that a consolidated
government, partaking in a great degree of republican
principles, in so extensive a territory, could not alone preserve the essential rights of the people; and that he proposed introducing amendments looking to the preservation
of those rights; and all through the debates, this idea was,
as elsewhere, the leading principle upon which the opponents
of the Constitution relied-they feared centralization.
Throughout there is on all sides a realization of the necessity
for Union. Throughout there is perfect understanding that
the new Constitution differed vitally from the old. Mr.
Melancthon Smith, a leading opponent of the Constitution as
it came from the General Convention, said that an increase
in representation in the House would be a great improvement; it would make that body more truly representative.
He said that there were here, as elsewhere, "natural aristocrats"--that is, men whose superior ability and attainments
differentiated them from the mass of their fellow-men, and
that it would not be well that all the representatives should
favor this class. To avoid this, he suggested that the repre-
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sentation shoul be one for twenty thousand instead of one
for thirty thousand-a most remarkable proposition, in view
of its object. The change would have entitled New York
to three additional representatives. Is it possible that the
stock of "natural aristocrats" in New York could have been
so exhausted by sending six to Congress that she could not
furnish three more? Mr. Hamilton, whose voice was not
often heard in the General Convention, displayed very signal
ability in this, reaffirming the arguments of Chancellor Livingston as to the necessity for a Government acting upon
individuals, and declaring over and over again that the principle of the Confederation must be totally eradicated and
discarded before an efficient Government could be expected.
This w-as not very seriously dissented from, although it was
said that all the ills the country had suffered from could not
fairly be laid at the door of the Articles of Confederation.
Mr. AVilliams, of the opposition, said that the Constitution
should be so framed as not to swallow up the State Governments: "The General Government ought to be confined to
certain National objects; and the States should retain such
powers as concern their own internal policy"-a principle
so sound that the most ardent Nationalist gladly assented to
it. Mr. Hamilton said that the balance between the National and State Governments was of the utmost importance;
and the same thing was said by others on both sides. Very
little declamation was indulged in, but Mr. G. Livingston
created some amusement by representing the Federal District as likely to be surrounded by "a wall of gold-of adamant, which will flow in from all parts of the Continent."
He did not hear the last of his flowing wall for many days.
In speaking of the Senate, in advocating a proposition to
give the various Legislatures the right to recall Senators,
Mr. Lansing said the Senate was intended to represent the
sovereignty of the States. "Now, if it was the design of
the plan to make the Senate a kind of bulwark to the independence of the States and a check to the encroachments of
the General Government, certainly the members of this body
ought to be peculiarly under the control, and in strict subordination to the State who delegated them." Mr. Livingston
(R. R.) replied that it was true the Senate was intended to
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represent the State Governments; "but they are also the representatives of the United States, and are not to consult the
interests of any one State alone, but that of the Union."
And Mr. Hamilton said that the design of the Senate was to
give stability and energy to the Government. The difference
between the propositions of Mr. Lansing and Chancellor
Livingston bring out most clearly, it seems to me, the two
schools of thought. If Mr. Lansing's premises are correct
-if the Senators are merely so many ambassadors, so to
speak, then, of course, the States should be at liberty to recall
them. Not so if Mr. Livingston's view be the true one; and
the utter impracticability of such a system as Mr. Lansing
desired was so patent that it found few supporters. Mr.
Hamilton said that the sacrifice of the States by the Senate,
in the General Government, was unimaginable. The States
are an essential part of the general system, and as long as
Congress realized this they must "even upon principles
purely National," have as firm an attachment to the State
Governments as to the General Government. In commenting upon the further remark that the aggregate representation in the State Governments and their aggregate energy
was greater than that of the National Government, Mr.
Lansing said, "Are the States arrayed in all the powers of
sovereignty? Can they maintain armies? Have they the
unlimited power of taxation? There is no comparison between thepowers of the two Governments." There is so much
of interest that was said, that it is extremely difficult to avoid
very frequent use of paste and scissors. I must not be
supposed to have directed attention to every well-put argument on either side, but only to have given samples, as it
were, of the general views which prevailed, and which were
so well brought out. The "general welfare" clause was animadverted upon by Mr. Williams, and so far as reported in
the debates, no one seems to have explained to him or to
the Convention that this only empowered Congress to raise
money for the general welfare-not to pass any and all laws
promotive of it. And so he went on most vigorously demolishing a man of straw. When the question of direct taxation
by Congress was under discussion-a leading point here as
elsewhere-Mr. Jay asked, "Would it be right or politic that
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the sovereign power of a nation should depend for support

on the mere will of the several members of that nation?
That the interests of a part should take [the] place of that
of the whole, or that the partial views of one of the members should interfere with and defeat the views of all ?"
Addressing himself to the danger of the annihilation of
the State Governments, which he greatly feared, Mr. Tredwell, in the course of an able speech, declared that the cardinal error, in the arguments of the supporters of the Constitution, was, that whatever powers were not granted by the

Constitution were reserved. He maintained that every State
Constitution was a recognition of the contrary principle, for

all contained express reservations in favor of the people. He
continued: "We are told this is a Federal Government. I
think, sir, there is as much propriety in the name as in that
which its advocates assume, and no more; it is, in my idea,
as complete a consolidation as the government of this State,
in which legislative powers, to a certain extent, are exercised
by the several towns and corporations.

The sole difference

between a State Government under this Constitution and a
corporation under a State Government is, that a State being
more extensive than a town, its powers are likewise proportionately extended; but neither of them dnjoys the least
share of sovereignty; for, let me ask, what is a State Government? What sovereignty, what power is left to it, when
"the control of every source of revenue, and the total command of the militia are given to the General Government?
That power which can command both the property and the
persons of the community is the sovereign, and the sole sovereign. The idea of two distinct sovereignties in the same
country, separately possessed (italics in the original) of
sovereign and supreme power, in the same matters at the
same time, is as supreme an absurdity as that two distinct
separate circles can be bounded by the same circumference."
Of course, Mr. Tredwell was wrong in saying that the States
were reduced to mere corporations by the Constitution, even
admitting that the Constitution conferred all powers on Congress not prohibited. It still remained to the States to pass
laws-not mere municipal regnlations-laws for the punishment of crime, for descent and inheritance, etc. But he
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was clearly right in the absurdity of "dual sovereignty" in
any true sense. And this brings us to note the absence here,
as in Virginia and Massachusetts, of any objection to vesting the highly sovereign powers in Congress. I can but repeat, that centralization, and the consequent deprivation
of the people of the immediate control of their own affairs,
was the great evil against which the opponents of the Constitution were fighting. It is quite noteworthy, too, that, so
far as reported, there was no discussion of account upon
the words, "We, the people." Numerous amendments, analogous to those brought forward by Virginia and Massachusetts were proposed and suggested to Congress and to the
other States in a circular letter. The original form of ratification was "upon condition," etc. This was changed to
"in full confidence," and a motion by Mr.Lansing to reserve
to New York a right to withdraw from the Union under
certain circumstances was voted down. The Constitution was
then ratified by the very narrow majority of three-thirty to
twenty-seven.
Lucius S. Landreth.

